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NOTES
RHODE ISLAND IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY FOR
CONTAMINATION OF WATER BY PERCOLATION OF
POLLUTANTS FROM ILLEGAL DUMP SITE

Rhode Island has entered the mainstream of nuisance law by holding that a showing of negligence is not required to hold a defendant
liable for pollution of water as a result of pollutants percolating
through the soil. While the decision creates a strong deterrent to
water pollution, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, by specifically
limiting its holding to instances in which water is contaminated
through percolation, declined to impose strict liability for water pollution in general. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982).

INTRODUCTION
In 1977, a fire erupted on Piggy Hill in Coventry, Rhode Island, sending
fifty-foot flames and huge billows of black smoke into the air and, naturally, attracting the attention of public authorities. The source of the fire
was an illegal chemical dump site maintained by Picillo, one of the
defendants in this action.' The defendants were responsible for dumping
2
toxic chemical wastes into a trench on a pig farm at the top of the hill.
The trench, 200 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 20 feet deep, contained at
least a six-inch "viscous layer of pungent, varicolored liquid" and its
banks were lined with more than 100 drums of chemicals. 3 At the base
of the hill were two homes and a marshy wetland that drained into several
ponds and streams inhabited by fish and used for recreation and for
commercial cranberry growing.
Despite the state fire marshall's order that the site be cleaned up, the
dumping continued. In 1979, officials discovered a second dump site on
4
the hill when" 'sink holes' emitting chemical odors opened in the earth."
1. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982).
2. The chemicals included toluene, xylene, chloroform, 1,1, I-trichloroethane, and trichloroethylene. 443 A.2d at 1246. Chloroform, trichloroethane, and trichloroethylene are "strong carcinogens
that cause cirrhosis (cell death) of the liver and hepatoma (cancer of the liver)." Id. Toluene and
xylene have a toxic effect on bone marrow and chloroform, when heated to 68°F, converts to phosgene
gas, "a nerve gas of the type utilized in World War I." An expert witness testified that sunlight
would provide enough heat to turn chloroform present in surface water into phosgene gas. Id. at
1246-47.
3. 443 A.2d at 1246.
4. Id.
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Chemicals from both sites had percolated through the soil to the water
below, causing a reddish discoloration and an oily surface. A chemical
odor pervaded the area, and at one location "chemicals seeped out of the
ground as if from a spring." 5 Inhalation of volatile organic chemicals
from the dump caused nausea, headaches, and other discomforts in the
nearby residents. 6 According to a Brown University professor of medicine, there is no safe level for human or animal exposure to some chemicals that were present at the site.7
The trial court, horrified by this "chemical nightmare," declared the
dump site a public and private nuisance, and granted the plaintiffs relief
by allowing them to arrange for clean-up at defendants' expense. 8 Defendants appealed the ruling directly to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
arguing that plaintiffs had failed to meet their obligation to show that
defendants acted negligently in disposing chemical wastes on defendants'
property. The Court found this argument without merit after observing
that Rhode Island followed the widely recognized rule in nuisance cases
that proof of negligence is not required to establish a defendant's liability.
THE GENERAL RULE AND ITS EXCEPTION
Generally, negligence need not be proved in a nuisance case because
the original nature of the defendant's conduct becomes unimportant if
the defendant, once notified of the nuisance, fails to eliminate the problem. The defendant, in continuing to allow the nuisance to exist, is
presumed to act intentionally to the plaintiff's detriment. Therefore the
defendant's original intent is largely irrelevant. 9 Nuisance, according to
Prosser, "is not a separate tort in itself, subject to rules of its own." 1°
Nuisances are types of damages, resulting from tortious conduct, whether
negligent or not.
In establishing that Rhode Island usually follows the general rule, the
Court examined the distinction between negligence and nuisance liability,
as expressed in the 1934 case of Braun v. lannotti,"1 where soot and
smoke from defendant's furnace blew onto plaintiff's property. The Braun
Court reasoned that the basis of defendant's liability was unreasonable
injury rather than unreasonable conduct and, therefore, an allegation of
5. Id. at 1247, n. 3.
6. Id. at 1246.
7. Id. Dr. Nelson Fausto, a professor of medical sciences in the pathology division of the Department of Biological and Medical Sciences at Brown University, testified in Wood as an expert
witness.
8. Id. at 1247. The defendants only had to finance the clean-up, probably because the State of
Rhode Island, as a plaintiff, would control the operation.
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §87 at 576 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Id. at 577.
I1. 54 R.I. 469, 175 A. 656 (1934).
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negligence could be "discarded as surplusage." 12 The defendant was held
liable for creating a nuisance, even though his conduct may have been
reasonable, because the harm, not defendant's conduct, was the nuisance.
Therefore, under the general rule, even a reasonably prudent defendant
can be held liable for a nuisance.
THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
In Rose v. Sacony-Vacuum Corp.," however, Rhode Island created an
exception to the general rule. The facts in Rose are similar to those in
Wood. Storage tanks at defendant's oil refinery discharged and leaked
petroleum waste products into streams and ponds on the defendant's own
property. The pollutants trickled through the soil and into plaintiff farmer's
water supply, poisoning and killing 700 hens and 75 breeding sows. The
plaintiff failed to plead negligence and merely argued that he was harmed
by defendant's creation of a nuisance. The Court ruled that the defendant
could not be held liable unless it had acted negligently because the refinery
was a necessity of modem life, and individual rights of persons living
near the refinery had to be compromised for the benefit of the community
as a whole. The Rose Court stated that if,
in the process of refining petroleum, injury is occasioned to those
in the vicinity, not through negligence or lack of skill or the invasion
of a recognized legal right, but by the contamination of percolating
waters whose courses are not known, we think that public policy
justifies a determination that such harm is damnum abseque injuria
[a loss that does not give rise to an action for damages]. 14
The Court pointed out that jurisdictions imposing liability without a
showing of negligence are primarily characterized by agricultural economies, perhaps referring to the importance placed on water in such jurisdictions, compared with a need in industrial economies to tolerate water
pollution. 5 The Rose Court declined to impose strict liability on the
defendant because of the importance of petroleum products to the local
economy and because of the mystery of the courses of groundwater.
ROSE REJECTED
The Wood Court overruled Rose for several reasons. First, because of
present sophisticated knowledge of hydrology, the flow of groundwater
is no longer "obscure and mysterious." Scientific experts who testified
12. 54 R.I. at 471, 175 A. at 657.
13. 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934); a companion case with the same ruling is Rose v. Standard
Oil Co., 56 R.I. 272, 185 A. 251 (1936).
14. 54 R.I. at.., 173 A. at 631-32.
15. 54 R.I. at __,173 A. at 631.
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in Wood demonstrated that the paths of underground water can be determined accurately.6 Second, the Court reasoned that "[c]oncern for the
preservation of an often precarious ecological balance, impelled by the
spectre of a 'silent spring,' has today reached a zenith of intense significance. "17 Therefore, the Court determined that the scientific and policy
considerations underlying the Rose decision are no longer valid. 8
The Court overruled precedent on the basis of changed knowledge and
social values. Essential to its rejection of Rose is that individual rights
do not have to be set aside to allow pollution by an industry that benefits
the public at large. The Court clearly recognized that the right of people
living near an industrial site to enjoy their land is superior to the rights
of the creator of a nuisance. Therefore, despite a community's economic
dependence on an industry, that industry cannot be allowed to create a
situation by which nearby residents are harmed.
In setting aside Rose, the Rhode Island Court recognized that the rights
of these residents must be weighed against the value, or perhaps necessity,
of allowing an industry to pollute local water supplies. The Wood Court
determined that in the balance, the rights of individual residents to enjoy
their land outweigh policy reasons for allowing an industry to pollute
water with impunity even though the industry is important economically.
The logical result of this balancing is that communities that depend on
the industry, along with consumers of the industry's product, must pay
the cost of preserving the nearby residents' right to use and enjoy their
land and appurtenant water. The cost may be paid through loss of jobs
and products if the industry is forced to cease operations, or through
increased costs of those products due to the added expense of pollution
controls. 19
Although the Court observed the importance of preserving individual
rights, despite the cost, the Wood decision will maintain those rights only
in a circumscribed factual setting. The Court carefully limited its application of strict liability to cases in which water is contaminated by pollutants percolating through the soil. This constriction does not greatly
diminish the importance of the Court's application of strict liability because Wood still applies to a large number of cases (i.e., those involving
pollution of ground water through percolation).
There are several reasons which support the narrow ruling. The plaintiffs did not plead negligence, so the Court had to reach beyond the
petition to find a theory under which to hold the defendants liable. The
16.
17.
18.
19.

443 A.2d at 1249.
Id.
Id.
These costs would also apply to the .nearby residents themselves.
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Court could have allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include
negligence, but chose instead to apply a theory of strict liability to deter
improper chemical disposal. In support of its desire to employ strict
liability as a deterrent, the Court cited widespread and serious public
concern for the environment, and apparently took the position that current
public policy favors strong measures in situations as dangerous as the
dumping of chemical wastes which are potentially fatal to humans or
animals. 20 By imposing strict liability, the Wood decision seeks to make
improper chemical disposal less attractive to companies with otherwise
strong economic incentives to dump illegally.
Another possible reason the Court did not require proof of negligence
is that the plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief to stop further disposal
of chemicals at the site and to have the site cleaned up. The plaintiffs
did not demand money damages and were clearly not seeking financial
gain or cessation of the business operation that produced the dangerous
chemical wastes. They only asked that the site be cleaned up and that
future chemical disposals be done properly at an appropriate place. Therefore, the Court was more willing to hold the defendants liable without
requiring proof of negligence in addition to a showing of nuisance.
Finally, the public policy relied on in Wood favors measures to prevent
improper chemical dumping when the pollution involved is so clearly
and immediately dangerous. The public, however, would probably not
support an application of the Court's holding to less immediately hazardous forms of contamination, especially when the benefits of allowing
the pollution are generally seen to outweigh the costs of prevention.
Pollution prevention in general may be an important issue in Rhode Island,
but because the state is heavily industrialized, a broader holding by the
Wood Court could have seriously harmed the state's economy. 2 ' It is clear,

20. 443 A.2d at 1249.
21. In 1977, Rhode Island had 3,107 manufacturing establishments in a state with a land area of
1,049 square miles, employing 125,100 persons out of a population of 947,154 (1980 estimate).
The value added to the economy was $2,736,700,000. RAND McNALLY & CO., 1982 COMMERCIAL ATLAS & MARKETING GUIDE 479 (113th ed. 1982). Rand-McNally assigned Rhode
Island 4,678 "Ranally Manufacturing Units." The Units are "based on value added by manufacture
according to the 1977 Census of Manufactures. . . . Each Ranally Manufacturing Unit equals .0001%
of the total United States value added by manufacture in 1977." Id. at 4. Therefore, in 1977 Rhode
Island contributed almost 0.5% of the total United States value added by manufacture. The importance
of Rhode Island manufacturing is increasing, as the State's number of Ranally Manufacturing Units
increased 55.1% between 1972 and 1977. Id. at 479.
To further illustrate the extent of Rhode Island's industrialization, it may be compared with New
Jersey, a state known for its industrial development. New Jersey is assigned 39,059 Ranally Manufacturing Units, has a population of 7,364,158 (1980) and covers a land area of 7,521 square miles.
id. at 394. New Jersey is more than seven times as large as Rhode Island in land area and population,
and has more than eight times as many Ranally Manufacturing Units. Because the proportion of
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then, that there may be circumstances in which the importance of continued manufacturing operations outweighs the rights of local residents
to be free of a nuisance the industry creates. In these cases, alternatives
to injunctive relief can be considered.
In nuisance cases where recovery damages are allowed, the general
rule is that where "a nuisance is of such a permanent and unabatable
character that a single recovery can be had, including the whole damage
past and future resulting therefrom, there can be but one recovery ...
[P]ermanent damages are allowed where the loss recoverable would ob-22
viously be small as compared with the cost of removal of the nuisance."
The Wood Court did not discuss the possibility of awarding damages to
the plaintiffs, perhaps because one of the plaintiffs was the State of Rhode
Island (interested only in clean-up). In addition, the dump site was illegal
and potentially lethal to life in the area, and the plaintiffs' harm could
have been prevented. Therefore, the Court stopped the dumping and
ordered a clean-up at the defendants' expense instead of allowing the
defendants the less expensive option of paying damages. Another similar
alternative was issuance of an injunction conditioned on the payment of
permanent damages by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The defendants,
under such a ruling, could have chosen payment of damages instead of
clean-up costs.
Other remedies not considered by the Court included forcing the defendants to buy the entire area it contaminated, or allowing the government to make the purchase, as was done recently in Times Beach, Missouri.
These options could be impractical because of the nature of the chemical
contamination, which had entered a water supply and traveled considerable distances. Additionally, these remedies would not serve as an
adequate deterrent to improper chemical disposal in Rhode Island. Conceivably, chemical companies could appropriate land by dumping where
it is convenient, knowing they would only have to buy the parcel or,
better yet, that the governmefit would pay the cost.
CONCLUSION
The Court's holding is more conservative than it first appears. The
Court implied that a finding of negligence on the part of a defendant may
population, land area, and Manufacturing Units between the states roughly correspond, it is clear
the states are comparably industrialized.
It may be helpful to compare these two states with less industrialized states. New Mexico, with
a land area of 121,412 square miles and a population of 1,299,968 (1980) had 1,255 Manufacturing
Units in 1977, Id. at 401, while Vermont, with 9,267 square miles and 511,456 people (1980), had
1,796 Manufacturing Units, Id. at 515.
22. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312, 317-18 (1970).

July 1983]

RHODE ISLAND IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY

be inherent in a trial court's determination that a nuisance exists. Nevertheless, the Court said a specific finding of negligence is not necessary
to impose liability because the essential element of an actionable nuisance
is that the plaintiff has suffered harm or been threatened with injuries he
should not have to bear. 23 This reasoning is consistent with the notion
that a defendant, once notified that a nuisance exists, harms a plaintiff
intentionally if the nuisance is allowed to continue to exist. The Wood
Court was unwilling to disrupt the state's economy for the sake of environmental concerns but, nonetheless, wanted to hold the defendants
liable for the outrageous nuisance they created, and to deter similar behavior by requiring the clean-up of the dump even though less costly
remedies were available. The Wood decision brought Rhode Island into
line with most other states by abolishing the negligence requirement for
a nuisance involving percolating waters. 24 As was evident in this case,
the Rhode Island courts are aware of the great need for strict water
pollution standards, and will not tolerate as serious a nuisance as was
created in Wood. The courts, however, are not yet willing to impose strict
liability for water pollution in general because of potential cases in which
the adverse economic consequences to the community exceed the actual
injuries to specific residents.
EDWARD L. HAND

23. 443 A.2d at 1247, citing Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53,
59 (R.I. 1980) and Braun v. lannotti, 54 R.I. 469, 471, 175 A. 656, 657 (1934).
24. For example, New York, as early as 1866, has held defendants strictly liable for allowing
Aater to percolate onto plaintiff's property. Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866). Even though this
:ase did not involve pollution as a result of percolation, the principles are the same-damage caused
is a result of fluids percolating. Similar cases are Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gadsden Sand
ktGravel Co., 248 Ala. 273, 27 So.2d 578 (1946); International & G.N.R. Co. v. Slusher, 42 Tex.
'iv. App. 631, 95 S.W. 717 (1906); City of Barberton v. Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387
1934). Rose was Rhode Island's first case involving percolation.

